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Abstract: There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of 
aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning 
representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly 
avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand 
between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation 
of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts and terms themselves). 
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1. Setup 
1.1. Aboutness and co-aboutness 
Representations are often about things. My belief that Porto is beautiful is about Porto, and the 
name ‘Greta Thunberg’ is about Greta Thunberg. It is this aboutness, also known as intentionality,1 
that is the focus of this paper. Although many sorts of representations (thoughts, attitudes, 
linguistic items, maps, pictures, etc.) have aboutness, I will mostly discuss beliefs. Not much hangs 
on this choice, much of what I say here can be generalized to other kinds of representations. 
To use a common illustration, consider a pair of archers drawing their bows at a range of targets. 
The archers stand in for representations and (according to the orthodox conception of aboutness at 
                                                             
1 I prefer the 'aboutness' label since intentionality is often confused with intensionality. 
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least) the various targets that the archer might hit stand in for the objects that are candidates to be 
what the representation is about (candidate intentional objects). 
There is a related feature of representations that will be of special interest here. Some 
representations have a common intentional focus, they are about the same thing. Two beliefs of 
mine may be about Stockholm. Different agents often have beliefs about the same thing. In terms 
of the archer illustration, the archers may direct their shots at the same target. This relation of 
having a common focus is sometimes called ‘intentional identity’, a label due to Geach (1967, 
627). I will use ‘intentional identity’, ‘co-aboutness’ and ‘co-intentionality’ interchangeably.2 We 
can ask whether any pair of representations are co-intentional but the question is particularly 
interesting when it concerns apparently empty representations, that is, representations that appear 
to be about things that do not exist. 
1.2. Target first approaches 
According to a common approach to explaining aboutness and co-aboutness, we ought to focus on 
the objects representations are about (their ‘intentional objects’). These are what I will call ‘target 
first’ conceptions of aboutness. In terms of the archer simile, target first approaches suggest that 
which objects the arrow actually hits captures the intentionality of the archer’s shot. If this is right, 
to understand the intentionality of a given representation, we need only identify its intentional 
object, and to explain why a given representation has the intentionality it has, we need only explain 
why it is about that object. Roughly speaking, those who adopt the target first approach suggest 
that aboutness is just reference and that co-aboutness is just co-reference. 
According to the target fist approach, what explains co-aboutness is the presence of some object 
that the representations are about. Priest (2005, 65 n.12), Salmon (2005, 105-108), Parsons (1980, 
65 n.2), and others defend theories of co-aboutness that are target first in this way.  
Target first approaches to aboutness and co-aboutness are attractive and plausible. However, there 
are puzzles that are almost universally taken seriously by those working on aboutness that arise 
                                                             
2 I prefer the latter two labels since ‘intentional identity' suggests that the relation must be 
explained in terms of identity relations among intentional objects. As we will see, this treatment 
of co-aboutness should not be taken as given. 
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only if we adopt the target first approach. This suggests that those many figures in the literature 
are committed, implicitly or explicitly, to the target first approach to aboutness. 
1.3. Goals and the plan 
My primary goal in this paper is to propose an alternative approach to aboutness. I will propose 
that when explaining aboutness and co-aboutness, we ought to focus on the representations 
themselves and the relationships that stand between them (how the bows are directed). What is 
distinctive about non-target first approaches is that they do not give a central explanatory role to 
intentional objects. My proposal gives the objects the representations are about no role in 
explaining the aboutness of representations. The proposal is also distinctively co-aboutness first; 
it is not just archer first, so to speak, it is archers first. In a nutshell, the idea is that the aboutness 
of particular representations is explained in terms of which representations they are co-intentional 
with. I propose to explain aboutness in terms of relations of co-aboutness.3 For those familiar with 
abstractionism in the philosophy of mathematics, my proposal can be understood as a kind of 
abstractionism about intentionality. I will argue that understanding aboutness in this co-aboutness 
first way helps us dissolve stubborn and influential puzzles that many leading theories of aboutness 
face and leads to an otherwise attractive and interesting approach to aboutness. 
Here is the plan. I first distinguish the narrow content of representations and their aboutness. In 
the process I clarify the explanatory roles that aboutness plays. This will yield some important 
tools that will allow us to evaluate theories of aboutness later in the paper. I then discuss two sorts 
of puzzles that most theories of aboutness face, underdetermination puzzles and puzzles 
concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. These puzzles are 
seldom tackled together. This is significant since some well-received solutions to one of these 
kinds of puzzles do not help (and sometimes hinder) efforts to solve the puzzles of the other kind. 
I will then give a diagnosis of these puzzles; they arise only if we adopt a target first approach to 
aboutness and co-aboutness. I then sketch my own approach, discuss some constraints on how it 
                                                             
3 In this way, my proposal differs from other archer first theories of aboutness defended by Farkas 
(2008), Kriegal (2008), Montague (2012), Mendelovici (2018), and others. These views, which 
are typically grouped under the umbrella of ‘phenomenal intentionality theories' (PITS), center on 
the intrinsic phenomenal features of individual representations in their treatment of intentionality. 
For a recent discussion of how PITS relate to questions of co-aboutness, see Clutton and Sandgren 
(2019). 
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should be implemented, and explain how it dissolves the puzzles in question. Finally, I will 
consider and respond to two lines of objection. 
1.4. Aboutness and narrow content 
Let us distinguish the aboutness of an attitude from its narrow content. I will follow Lewis (1981; 
1986, 33) and Jackson (2010; 2015) in claiming that: 
(1) An attitude’s intentionality does not supervene on its narrow content. 
Suppose there are two situations in which Jill is sitting at a bar when she sees a man walk in and 
sit down. In both cases she sees the man is wearing a hood (she cannot see his face) and in both 
cases she does not recognize the man but forms the belief that the man sitting at the bar is tall. The 
only difference between the cases is that the man at the bar is Jill’s brother in one case, but a 
stranger in the other. What Jill’s belief that the man at the bar is tall is about is different in these 
two cases; in one it is about her brother, in the other it is not. But there is also something that her 
beliefs have in common across the cases. They are the same from her point of view, at least in 
some sense. Let’s call the feature of beliefs that captures this commonality the ‘narrow content’ of 
those beliefs. Suppose the beliefs in question are also true; the man at the bar really is tall in both 
cases. An attitude’s narrow content captures its role in the psychology of the agent, guiding 
behavior and cognition, and any phenomenology associated with that attitude. The contrast 
between the two cases is a good reason to believe (1). Between the two scenarios there is a 
difference in what the beliefs are about but no difference in their narrow content, so an attitude’s 
aboutness does not supervene on its narrow content. By taking (1) as a starting point for this paper, 
I am setting aside views according to which the narrow content of an attitude fully determines its 
aboutness.4 
Narrow content and aboutness play different theoretical roles. An attitude’s narrow content is tied 
to its psychological, cognitive, behavioral, and phenomenal role. Exactly how to understand 
narrow content is not the focus of this paper. 
A representation’s aboutness helps explain co-ordination, communication, agreement, and 
disagreement concerning the intentional target of that representation. We often communicate, 
                                                             
4 For a discussion of the view that aboutness is narrow, see Farkas (2008). 
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agree, coordinate or disagree about things. Aboutness allows agents to track things across 
representations. For example, when I go from knowing little about some object to knowing more 
about that same object, one of the reasons that this is an instance of learning more about one thing 
rather than coming to represent a different object is that the earlier and later representations are 
about the same thing. Or to take an interpersonal example, when someone thinks that Daniel is in 
his office and someone else thinks Daniel is at home, they may be disagreeing partly in virtue of 
their beliefs being about the same thing. The aboutness of the representations unifies distinct 
representations by their tracking of the same subject matter, what they are about.  
Yablo (2014), Fine (2014; 2016), and others suggest that what a representation is about crucially 
depends on what makes it true or would make it true. In this way, the aboutness (or subject matter) 
of a representation is supposed to supervene on its truth conditions. For present purposes I will 
stay neutral on whether this is correct. It is not obviously correct. For example, on a plausible view 
of the truth conditions of beliefs, Pierre’s belief that London is pretty might be true just in case 
there is a Londonish thing (a Londonizer) that is pretty but this belief could be about London all 
the same (Lewis 1981; 1983). For a recent discussion concerning how aboutness and truth 
conditions might come apart, see Sandgren (2019b section 4). 
2. Puzzles 
2.1. Underdetermination 
Underdetermination puzzles are much discussed and influential. They take many forms and differ 
in detail (Wittgenstein 1953; Quine 1960; Benacerraf 1965; Devitt 1981; Kripke 1982; Lewis 
1983; Putnam 1988).5 Underdetermination puzzles have a common structure; there are too many 
things that are candidates to be the intentional object of a representation and not enough resources 
to distinguish between them. That is, it is often underdetermined what the intentional object of a 
representation is. 
Here are two examples to illustrate the structure of underdetermination puzzles, the first adapted 
from Wiggins (1968), the second from Kripke (1982). Suppose Harriet, on coming into a room, 
                                                             
5 Underdetermination puzzles have an ancient pedigree. An underdetermination puzzle takes 
center stage in Plato's Cratylus (385a-390e) in the form of an argument against the conventionalist 
view attributed to Hermogenes. 
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forms the belief that Tibbles is on the mat. What is this belief about? One thing it seems to be about 
is Tibbles. But what is Tibbles? There are many objects on the mat, cat legs, whiskers, ears, fusions 
of whiskers and hairs, cats-minus-17-hairs, cats-minus-18-hairs, and so on.6 Which one of these is 
what the belief is about? Perhaps Harriet intends to pick out a cat, rather than a cat leg and this 
goes some way to rule out some objects as candidates to be what the belief is about. The problem 
is that however rich the relevant intentions are, there will always be several objects that are 
candidates to be what the belief is about that fit these intentions equally well. That is, which object 
this relatively banal belief is about is underdetermined. There appear to be too many candidates to 
be what the belief is about and not enough resources in the intension of the believer or anywhere 
else, to uniquely determine which object the belief is about.7  
Suppose Jack is learning how to add for the first time. His mathematics teacher demonstrates how 
to add two numbers together and gives him some practice sums. On completing the first sum, 3 
and 4, and arriving at 7 as the answer, Jack forms the belief that he has just performed addition. 
What operation is this belief about? The natural answer is ‘addition’. But there are, to put it mildly, 
a whole lot of different operations that deliver the same output as the plus function when 3 and 4 
are the inputs, but deliver quite different results when the inputs are different. Given the sheer 
number of functions, this will be true for any function and set of inputs. There will always be more 
than one function that delivers the same outputs as a given function over some set of inputs but 
deliver different outputs if given other inputs. If there are any functions at all, there an awful lot 
of them. For this reason, if all we have to go on when assigning functions to representations is the 
outputs the function delivers in a relatively small set of cases, there will always be more than one 
function fit to be what the attitude is about. One particular function will never be uniquely selected 
from the throng. Again, what the representation is about is underdetermined; there are too many 
candidate targets and not enough resources for distinguishing between them.  
                                                             
6 For a recent excellent discussion of this kind of plenitude, see Fairchild (2019). 
7 What if one adopts a relatively sparse object ontology such that most of these fine-grained entities 
do not exist (for example, the ontology of ordinary objects defended by Korman (2015))? Isn't one 
out of the woods here, at least as regards the Tibbles case? In presenting the problem we seemed 
to be coherently talking and thinking about the different fine-grained entities. If one has a sparse 
ontology, one is committed to treating those representations as empty, so by making this move, 
one has turned a problem of too many into a problem of too few. This might be advisable as far as 
it goes, but the puzzles discussed in section 2.2 come in full force. 
7 
 
When confronted with these kinds of underdetermination puzzles, some, like McGee and 
McLaughlin (2000), deny that we can have genuinely singular thoughts about particular objects. 
Weatherson (2003, 488-489) proposes instead that these problems force us to revise our conception 
of what it takes to think about particular objects, suggesting with Jeshion (2002) that it is possible 
to have a de re belief about an object without being acquainted with it, either directly (e.g. via 
perception) or indirectly (e.g. via testimony). Recently, Merlo (2017) and Openshaw (forthcoming) 
have suggested that representations are in fact about all the candidate intentional objects. 
Another common response to these kinds of underdetermination puzzles, defended by Lewis 
(1983; 1984), Sider (2011), and others, is to claim that some of the candidate objects are especially 
eligible to be what representations are about. Eligibility is standardly conceived of as coming in 
degrees; some object might be more eligible than a second but less eligible than a third. This 
relative eligibility is taken to be independent of the psychology and conventions of representers. 
If some objects are more eligible than others, we have a way to break the troubling ties between 
candidate intentional objects. The relevant attitudes might be about the plus function partly 
because the plus function is intrinsically more eligible to be an intentional object than other similar 
functions. Harriet’s belief might be about the cat on the mat partly in virtue of the relations of 
relative eligibility that stand between the different candidate intentional objects. To return to the 
archer illustration, if the eligibility suggestion is correct, some of the targets attract arrows to them 
more strongly than others. I will not address or evaluate the eligibility move directly, though it will 
help to keep it in mind as we proceed. 
2.2. ‘Empty’ representations 
The second kind of puzzle concerns representations that are apparently about things that do not 
exist. Puzzles concerning empty representations are also influential and stubborn. They 
significantly guided early analytic philosophy of mind and language (Brentano 1874; Meinong 
1904; Russell 1905; Quine 1948).8 Again, these puzzles come in many forms but have a common 
structure; certain representations seem to have aboutness but there appears to be no object such 
that they are about it. There are apparently not enough candidate intentional objects. Suppose an 
agent believes that Vulcan is rocky. This belief appears to be about Vulcan. But how could this be 
                                                             
8 Puzzles involving empty representations also have an ancient pedigree. For instance, cases of 
this sort are central to the discussion in Plato's Sophist (236d-364b). 
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if there is no such planet? The apparent intentional object of this belief appears to be missing. So 
it seems hard to make sense of the intentionality of this belief (it seems hard to find an intentional 
object for that belief).  
A common response to this kind of puzzle is to bring exotic objects into the picture. The central 
idea is that apparently empty representations have intentional objects, appearances 
notwithstanding. They are just not the sort of familiar everyday objects we are familiar with. 
Different versions of this view involve different claims about the objects that apparently empty 
representations are about. Some, like Meinong (1904), appeal to non-existent objects. Others 
appeal to abstract objects (Salmon 2005; Thomasson 1999). Still others appeal to merely possible 
objects (Lewis 1978; 1983). In each case, the idea is to add in some more objects as possible 
candidates to be what representations are about so that apparently empty representations end up 
with intentional objects after all. 
2.3. Interplay 
Appealing to exotic objects to handle cases involving empty representations makes 
underdetermination puzzles harder. Underdetermination puzzles arise because there are too many 
candidate objects. By adding the exotic objects as candidate objects, we add even more objects 
that must be distinguished when assigning intentional objects to representations. Not only will 
there be all the everyday objects to choose from, there will be all the exotic objects as well. 
Maybe there are eligibility constraints on aboutness that will help us distinguish between everyday 
objects as candidate intentional objects. But it seems like these eligibility constraints will not allow 
us to make the appropriate distinctions between exotic objects. Exotic objects are one thing, 
relatively eligible exotic objects are quite another. 
Note that eligibility constraints can make some distinctions between exotic objects but not the 
distinctions we need to handle underdetermination. For example, maybe all the non-existent 
witches are more eligible than all the non-existent schwitches (where schwitches are the same as 
witches, except on Tuesdays when they are unicorns). But this sort of relative eligibility will not 
suffice. To do the required work, the eligibility constraints would have to distinguish between 
different particular exotic objects and not merely between different kinds of exotic objects. After 
all, we are interested in representations about particular objects. It seems quite implausible that 
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particular exotic objects stand in these sorts of relative eligibility relationships; that one non-
existent, merely possible, or abstract witch is inherently more eligible than another to be what an 
attitude is about. 
These puzzles tend to be discussed separately and this interplay is seldom noticed. Here is a lesson 
to take away: when considering and evaluating solutions to these two puzzles, we ought to keep 
an eye on how the resources to which we are appealing in our solution to one puzzle interact with 
the other kind of puzzle. 
2.4. A diagnosis 
These two kinds of puzzles have been hugely influential in shaping the course of (at least) analytic 
philosophy of mind and language. Each kind of puzzle has given rise to its own enormous 
literature. 
It seems to me that both kinds of puzzles (as they are traditionally posed) only arise if we adopt 
the target first approach to aboutness. Underdetermination poses a problem because if it is radically 
underdetermined which object the representation is about, then the aboutness of those 
representations is also radically underdetermined. In cases involving apparently empty 
representations, the relevant target appears to be missing and yet the representation has aboutness. 
This is puzzling if the aboutness of a representation is supposed to be captured in terms of the 
object it is about.  
The observation that the puzzles are so influential, combined with this explanation of how the 
puzzles arise, is evidence that the target first approach is common, even if it is seldom stated 
explicitly. Of course I do not claim that it is impossible to find a solution (rather than a dissolution) 
to both kinds of puzzles consistent with the target first approach. But if the target first approach 
gives rise to these stubborn and influential puzzles, it is worth considering alternative approaches 
to intentionality. The diagnosis also reveals some interesting theoretical possibilities; if we can 
explain aboutness and co-aboutness in a non-target first way, we can sidestep the puzzles 
altogether. 
3. The proposal 
3.1. Co-aboutness again 
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The target first conception of aboutness and co-aboutness leads naturally to the following 
conception of aboutness, co-aboutness, and the relationship between the two: what explains the 
aboutness of particular representations is the object they are about and what explains co-
intentionality is that the representations are about the same object. In terms of the archer simile, 
the target hit captures the directedness of the shots and the shots are directed in the same way if, 
and only if, the archers both hit the same target. 
Geach famously poses a challenge to this way of understanding co-aboutness in line with the archer 
simile. 
[A] number of archers may all point their arrows at one actual target...but we may 
also be able to verify that they are all pointing their arrows the same way, regardless 
of finding out whether there is any shootable object at the point where the lines of 
fire meet (intentional identity). We have intentional identity when a number of 
people, or one person on different occasions, have attitudes with a common focus, 
whether or not there actually is something at that focus. (Geach 1967, 627) 
The idea is that representations can be co-intentional even when there is no thing such that they 
are about it. That is to say, apparently empty representations (such as beliefs about Vulcan, a witch, 
or the fountain of youth) can be co-intentional. 
Priest (2005, 65 n.12), Salmon (2005, 105-108), and Parsons (1980, 65 n.2), uphold the target first 
approach to co-aboutness in the face of Geach’s challenge. They argue that when the relevant 
representations are apparently empty, their co-aboutness is explained by the presence of the object 
they are about. These accounts differ in detail but involve the same basic explanation of co-
aboutness. Co-aboutness is explained by the presence of the object the representations are about 
(the target both archers hit).  
These theories of co-aboutness face significant underdetermination problems of roughly the kind 
discussed above (Thomasson 1996; 1999, 56-57; Sandgren 2018). This should not be surprising if 
my diagnosis of underdetermination puzzles is correct and given the interplay between the two 
puzzles discussed above. Here is a summary of a recent formulation of this underdetermination 
challenge from my ‘Which Witch is Which? Exotic Objects and Intentional Identity’ (Sandgren 
2018, 729-731): the collections of exotic objects are typically uncomfortably large. There is not 
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just one (non-existent, merely possible or abstract) witch, or merely a hundred, or merely a 
thousand. If we are committed to such things at all, there are ever so many witches, inter-Mercurial 
planets, and magic fountains. If the presence of an exotic object is going to explain why two 
apparently empty representations are co-intentional, we need a story about how each representation 
gets assigned this exotic object rather than some other and how two representations come to be 
about the very same exotic object. But the abundance of exotic objects combined with the 
observation that these objects do not stand in causal relations with agents in the way that everyday 
objects do, means that it is extremely difficult to give a principled story about how two 
representations get to be about the same exotic object. There are just too many objects to select 
from and not enough resources to appeal to when assigning them to representations. This is a kind 
of underdetermination argument that threatens target first theories of co-aboutness in full force. 
Others claim that we can make sense of co-aboutness without appealing to intentional objects in 
our explanation; they propose archer first theories of co-intentionality. Dennett (1968), Donnellan 
(1974), and Geach (1976) make early attempts at archer first explanations of co-aboutness. More 
recently, Perry (2001), Sainsbury (2010), Crane (2013, 165), Friend (2014), Pagin (2014), 
Sandgren (2019), and Garcia-Carpintero (forthcoming) have all defended archer first theories of 
co-aboutness. These views differ in detail, but they all attempt to explain co-aboutness without 
appealing to intentional objects (exotic or not). Instead, these accounts center on the features of 
the representations themselves and the relations that stand between them.9 
3.2. An alternative explanation 
I propose that we first adopt an archer first conception of co-aboutness and then appeal to relations 
of co-aboutness to explain the aboutness of particular representations. This proposal reverses the 
direction of explanation characteristic of target first approaches in two ways. Firstly, instead of the 
aboutness of the respective representations in combination explaining their co-aboutness, their co-
aboutness explains their individual aboutness. In this sense the proposal is archers (in the plural) 
first. This is the most novel part of the proposal and the part which distinguishes it from other 
archer first proposals. 
                                                             
9 Note that this does not mean that they do not involve intentional objects at all. Rather, the idea is 
that if intentional objects are part of the story, they do not explain the intentional features of 
representations. They are archer first, not archer only. 
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Secondly, according to the proposal, the relations of aboutness and co-aboutness are explanatory 
prior to the object the representations are about. Accordingly, the object representations are about 
does no work in explaining their aboutness.  
Here is an illustrative case: suppose I indicate some belief and ask ‘what is that belief about?’ 
Suppose you correctly answer ‘Stockholm’. When you give this answer, are you providing 
Stockholm, the city itself, as the answer? In a sense you are, your answer involves representing 
Stockholm. But there is a sense in which you do not supply the object itself as an answer. To see 
this, consider a case in which the correct answer to a ‘what is that belief about?’ question appears 
to involve representing something that does not exist. For example, the correct answer might well 
be ‘Vulcan’, even if the questioner and the answerer agree that there is no such planet. In cases 
like these, the correct answer seems to involve representing Vulcan without requiring the answerer 
to produce the planet, as it were. So it seems as if when correctly answering questions like ‘what 
is that belief about?’, we indicate an object or set of objects but we do not, in general, provide the 
object itself as the answer. So perhaps when one correctly answers ‘Stockholm’ in response to the 
question, one does not provide Stockholm itself as an answer, rather one provides a representation 
which, if the answer is correct, is about the same thing as the belief in question. This is an 
alternative explanation of what is going on in our talk of what representations are about; we are 
really negotiating relations of co-aboutness, rather than dealing in the objects themselves. The 
aboutness of a given representation is, on this picture, a product of a broader representational 
economy. We can, it seems, make sense of much of our discourse about what representations are 
about while appealing only to relations of co-aboutness roughly along the lines just mentioned. 
What is more, as long as we adopt an archer first approach to co-intentionality, we can do all this 
without having to appeal to a fact about which of the many candidate objects the relevant 
representations are about in our explanation. 
Recall that aboutness allows us to track things across representations, thereby facilitating 
disagreement, agreement, communication, etc. According to the orthodox view, the presence of an 
intentional object is required to unify the relevant representations as being about the same thing. I 
propose that on the contrary, we deal in co-aboutness directly when explaining this kind of 
tracking. What is more, many of the phenomena often associated with co-aboutness such as 
communication, disagreement, and agreement, can arise in cases in which the relevant 
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representations appear to be about things that do not exist. We can track what beliefs are about 
even when the intentional objects are apparently missing. However identification of subject matter 
is achieved in cases in which the relevant representations are empty, it is not obviously achieved 
in virtue of there being some object such that the representations are about it. In other words, 
aboutness is not just reference and co-aboutness is not just co-reference. 
Though the proposal is archers first it is not archers only. The proposal leaves room for the objects 
representations are about, it is just that these objects do not do any work in explaining the aboutness 
of representations. Once we have the relations of being about the same thing that stand between 
the relevant representation and other representations, we get the object it is about for free. The 
presence of the object the representations are about is not taken to explain their co-intentionality, 
rather it is a descriptive (rather than explanatory) fact that when you have relations of co-
intentionality, you also have the target the representations are about. This move fits with and is 
motivated by a kind of easy ontology approach defended by Carnap (1950) and, more recently, 
Thomasson (2015). We can still talk about ‘the object the representation is about’ but this target 
is, so to speak, a mere shadow of the relations of co-aboutness the representation stands in. 
Note that the co-aboutness first approach to aboutness also leaves room for representations to have 
reference. We can sensibly ask about whether a representation has reference, where reference is 
taken to be something distinct from aboutness. For example, one might suggest that a belief about 
Stockholm refers to Stockholm in a way that a belief about Vulcan does not refer to Vulcan. This 
is perfectly compatible with my proposal. The crucial point is that unlike those who adopt a target 
first approach, my proposal involves rejecting the claim that aboutness just is reference and the 
claim that aboutness can be explained in referential terms. If my proposal is right, reference and 
co-reference are not what explains aboutness and co-aboutness. But that does not entail that there 
is no such thing as reference.  
The central idea is that no matter how much a representer tries to think or talk about an object 
itself, they will, at best, only be able to produce yet another representation about the object. But 
this need not worry us. We can, I suggest, get everything we need with respect to aboutness and 
co-aboutness without appealing to the object itself as doing any explanatory work. 
3.3. Choosing a theory of co-aboutness 
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The co-aboutness first proposal crucially involves appealing to an archer first theory of co-
aboutness and we had better choose an archer first view that allows us to recapture as many of the 
attractive features of the target first approach as possible. There are a number of options here. For 
the purposes of illustration, it will be helpful to have an example of an archer first view of co-
aboutness in mind. To this end, I will outline the causal theory of co-aboutness defended by 
Donnellan (1974), leaving some details to the side. In broad terms, the idea is that co-aboutness is 
a matter of the representations themselves standing in the right sort of causal relations with each 
other. These causal relationships are characterized as usually involving individual psychological 
connections or deferential uses of words or concepts.10 Crucially, the causal chain in question need 
not involve the object or objects the respective representations are about (though sometimes it 
will). For instance, consider a case in which two people who live in the same village read the same 
newspaper report claiming that there is a witch terrorizing the village. It seems as if these people 
can form beliefs about the same witch. According to the simple causal account of co-intentionality, 
any beliefs they might form concerning the witch are co-intentional because they have a common 
causal history involving the newspaper article.  
I do not endorse the simple causal theory of co-aboutness. In fact, I think the simple causal theory 
is crucially limited. For example, as Edelberg (2002, 574-575) and Everett (2013, 96) argue, there 
are cases of co-aboutness that do not involve the kind of common causal history present in the 
newspaper case. Edelberg and Everett discuss cases analogous to Frege’s well-known Alpha-Ateb 
case except that the putative target of the representations is missing. For a recent discussion of this 
point, see Garcia-Carpintero (forthcoming, 12). These cases suggest that though causal links 
between the representations in question are often crucial for explaining co-aboutness, co-aboutness 
does not always require such a link. There are also complications concerning how causally isolated 
                                                             
10 Donnellan's view runs parallel with a causal theory of the semantics of proper names. The debate 
between purely causal theories of co-aboutness and the causal descriptivist theory of co-aboutness 
I defend elsewhere is analogous to the debate between a purely causal theory of proper names and 
the kind of causal descriptivism defended by Kroon (1987), Jackson (1998), Lewis (1984; 1987), 
and Braddon-Mitchell (2004). For a good recent discussion of the relationship between 
descriptivism and aboutness, see Dickie (2015). Note that causal descriptivist views of co-
aboutness should not be confused with the account of co-aboutness proposed by Crane (2013, 
164), according to which, co-aboutness is a matter of similarity between how the putative target is 
represented. See Dennett (1968, 336-338, 341) for an early defense of a similar similarity-based 
approach to co-aboutness. 
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agents might represent the same abstract object (e.g. a universal or a mathematical function). 
Again, whatever the explanation of co-aboutness in cases like this is, it cannot involve a causal 
link between the beliefs themselves since, ex hypothesi, the agents are causally isolated. Finally, 
there are issues arising from some ingenious cases due to Edelberg (1986; 2002) which seem to 
show that co-aboutness is sensitive to how the believers take the facts about the identity to be. It 
is not clear how one can accommodate this data within a simple causal account.  
The co-aboutness first approach to aboutness does not stand or fall with the simple causal account 
of co-aboutness. There are a number of not-purely-causal archer-first accounts of co-aboutness to 
choose from, for example Crane (2013, 165), Pagin (2014), Friend (2014), Sandgren (2019), and 
Garcia-Carpintero (forthcoming).  
Which one do I favor? The short answer is, predictably, my own. My proposal handles both the 
newspaper case and the cases just discussed that cause trouble for the simple causal account 
(Sandgren 2019, 3690). Moreover, some of the other not-purely-causal archer-first rivals to my 
proposal are not as general. For instance, Garcia-Carpintero’s view only applies to fictional cases 
(in which the believers do not take the target of their beliefs to be actual, concrete objects) and not 
to mythical cases (in which the believers believe that the target of their beliefs is actual and 
concrete.)11 My theory also accounts, in a natural way, for the Edelberg-style cases I alluded to 
above that suggest that facts about co-aboutness are often sensitive to how the believers take the 
identity facts to be (Sandgren 2019, 3692). These cases seem hard to capture within models based 
on similarity of representation (like Crane’s), at least without augmenting the story considerably, 
see Sandgren (2019, 3683-3685). However, since my proposal is fairly complex and my primary 
goal here is to discuss the co-aboutness first approach, it is beyond the scope of this paper to spell 
out and further motivate my theory of co-aboutness. For the purposes of illustrating the co-
aboutness first approach to aboutness I will work with the simple causal view. This illustrative 
choice is harmless since my view, and many of the other not-purely-causal archer-first theories of 
co-aboutness behave similarly to the simple causal theory (delivering the same verdicts for similar 
reasons) in the cases of co-aboutness discussed here. 
3.4. Ignorance, error, and disagreement 
                                                             
11 Garcia-Carpintero (forthcoming, 8-9) admits that this is a limitation of his proposal as it stands. 
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Target first approaches to aboutness and co-aboutness have a natural account of how agents can 
be ignorant or mistaken about what representations are about. Jill’s belief in the hooded man case 
is one such example. When the hooded man is her brother, her belief is about her brother, though 
she is ignorant of that fact. The explanation in line with the target first account is simple, what 
makes the difference is that the man she sees in the bar really is her brother in one case but not in 
the other. 
The target first approach also yields a simple and attractive account of how it is possible for agents 
to disagree about a target. Often part of what is required for disagreement is that the relevant 
attitudes are about the same thing. According to the target first approach, they are therefore about 
the same thing and, inasmuch as talking about the same thing is required for disagreement, they 
may be disagreeing.  
These and other features of the target first approach can be recaptured on my proposed picture, 
provided we are careful about which archer first account of co-aboutness we adopt. Consider an 
extension of the hooded man cases discussed above. Suppose that in both cases (in the case that 
the man at the bar is a stranger and the case when he is Jill’s brother) Jill also has a separate belief 
that her brother is excellent at table tennis. This belief is plausibly about her brother in both cases. 
But in one case Jill’s belief concerning the man at the bar is co-intentional with her table tennis 
belief, while in the other it is not. If we adopt the straightforward causal view of co-aboutness, this 
would be because the two beliefs stand in different causal relations in the two cases. Jill may be 
unaware or mistaken concerning whether her beliefs are co-intentional. According to the co-
aboutness first picture, which representations a representation is co-intentional with will determine 
its aboutness and she may be ignorant or mistaken about which of her beliefs are co-intentional. 
So if Jill is ignorant or mistaken about which representations her belief is co-intentional with, she 
is ignorant or mistaken about the intentionality of her belief.  
Any archer first theory of co-aboutness worth its salt will allow for disagreement between co-
intentional representations. Certainly, many archer first theories of co-aboutness do. The simple 
causal account certainly does. Which causal relations the representations stand in can vary freely 
with what properties are being ascribed to the intentional target, so there is nothing stopping 
representations being co-intentional and ascribing conflicting properties. 
3.5. The puzzles dissolved 
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The co-aboutness first account does not face the underdetermination puzzles and puzzles 
concerning empty representations discussed above. There is no mystery about how representations 
that appear to be about things that do not exist have aboutness. When they have intentionality, they 
will often stand in co-aboutness relations and, as long as we adopt an archer first account of co-
aboutness, the explanation of this co-aboutness will not involve identifying some common 
intentional object. If our explanation of intentionality does not appeal to intentional objects, it 
should not worry us that in some cases there appear to be too few intentional objects to go around. 
Traditional underdetermination puzzles do not arise either. The co-aboutness first explanation of 
the aboutness of a given representation will not involve identifying its intentional object. So the 
fact that there are too many candidate intentional objects need not concern us. Consider the case 
of Jack learning to add. I propose that the explanation of how he is thinking about the same function 
as his teacher does not involve both Jack and his teacher selecting the same function from the 
many. Rather, there is some explanation of how their representations are about the same thing that 
does not involve their intentional objects, and this directly explains the fact that Jack and his 
teacher can represent the same function. If we eschew intentional objects as an explanatory 
resource, our explanation of intentionality is not threatened by the fact that there are too many 
candidate intentional objects. 
These are not solutions but dissolutions of the puzzles. The proposal does not yield guidance on 
how representations get to refer to one object on the mat rather than another, or to one mathematical 
function rather than another. 
4. Objections 
I will now consider some objections to the co-aboutness first approach. Since the co-aboutness 
first proposal is the central topic of this paper, I will limit myself to objections to the co-aboutness 
first approach taken as a whole and set aside objections to this or that archer first theory of co-
aboutness.  
4.1. Lonely representations 
One might be tempted to object to the co-aboutness first approach as follows: suppose Robyn is 
looking out into a paddock at a horse. Suppose Robyn forms a belief that the horse in the paddock 
is grey. There is no one else around. Robyn’s representation seems to be about the horse. Yet there 
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is no one else around and, we can suppose, there might not be any representations of the horse 
other than Robyn’s. How can this intentionality be explained by an appeal to the belief’s being co-
intentional with other representations? 
Firstly, it is plausible that Robyn has more than one representation of the horse. For instance, her 
belief about the horse might be about the same thing as her visual representation of the horse. If 
this is true, the aboutness of Robyn’s belief can be captured partly in terms of its being co-
intentional with some of her other representations. 
But this response does not really address the spirit of the objection. What if Robyn had no other 
representations and there are no other representations of the horse? What if the representation is 
‘lonely’? Isn’t the belief about the horse even if it is the only representation of the horse in the 
scenario? How could an account of aboutness that rests on relations of co-aboutness explain this? 
I respond that there is another representation of the horse, even if we insist that there are no other 
representations of the horse in the scenario. The objector presenting the case is herself representing 
the horse.  
But doesn’t this make the intentional features of Robyn’s belief too dependent on how it is 
described or on its relationship to us qua theorists? I don’t think so. Recall that the aboutness of a 
belief can be distinguished from its role in the agent’s narrowly construed psychology. The belief 
described in the case may only have its aboutness partly in virtue of its being about the same thing 
as the representation of the theorist considering the case, but its psychological role is independent 
of that fact. She may reason, talk, and behave in accordance with the belief. These beliefs will 
guide Robyn’s behavior and cognition in a way that does not depend on its aboutness. Recall that 
aboutness is for tracking objects across representations. Aboutness allows us to track that horse 
(what the belief is about) across representations. In lonely representation cases, there are no other 
representations across which to track the intentional object. In these cases, the aboutness of the 
representation in question is idle, in a sense, except inasmuch as the person describing the case 
and their representations goes. Within the scenario, there is no other representation across which 
that horse, qua intentional target, needs to be tracked. 
4.2. Moving the bump under the rug 
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Another objection is that the proposal merely moves the puzzling underdetermination around. 
After all, for many pairs of representations, it will be underdetermined whether they are co-
intentional. Am I not trying to explain away puzzling underdetermination with something that is 
itself underdetermined in the same puzzling way? 
Co-aboutness will be somewhat underdetermined. Indeed, it would be suspicious if our account of 
co-aboutness did not allow for some underdetermination. Subject matter identification just is a 
somewhat messy business. However, this kind of underdetermination is importantly different from 
the kind of radical underdetermination at play in traditional underdetermination puzzles. 
Suppose Harriet and Meg walk into a room and in response to what they see form beliefs to the 
effect that Tibbles is on the mat. In line with the traditional underdetermination puzzle, we might 
wonder how each of these beliefs come to be about Tibbles, rather than one of the other candidate 
objects. According to the target first understanding of aboutness and co-aboutness, for these two 
beliefs to be about the same thing the underdetermination has to be resolved and it has to be 
resolved such that both Harriet's belief and Meg's belief are about the same object. They both need 
to uniquely pick out the same object. If we adopt the target first approach to aboutness, the kind 
of underdetermination tied to the traditional underdetermination puzzles gets in the way of 
delivering the correct verdicts about co-aboutness in simple cases like this. The kind of 
underdetermination that remains within a co-aboutness first story does not get in the way of these 
beliefs being co-intentional. If my proposal is right, what matters is that the representations are co-
intentional. The Harriet and Meg case is a clear case of co-aboutness according to all the leading 
archer first theories of co-aboutness. Maybe Harriet and Meg disagree about where, exactly, 
Tibbles ends (spatially, temporally, or even modally) and this might make a difference to which 
representations their respective representations are co-intentional with. But this sort of 
underdetermination is confined, on my picture, to the disputed cases of co-aboutness and does not 
threaten the clear cases of co-aboutness; the underdetermination is correctly confined to borderline 
cases. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The co-aboutness first approach is attractive and avoids some serious, influential and stubborn 
puzzles that threaten its rivals. I have only presented the view in broad outline and there are many 
important details to be filled in and refinements to be made. Nonetheless, I hope I have done 
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enough to suggest that the co-aboutness first approach to aboutness is worth taking seriously and 
that there is worthwhile work to be done refining the view, getting clear on its limitations, and 
exploring the theoretical opportunities it offers.12 
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